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ABSTRACT 
In  some  pure  moral  hazard  situations  the  principal  can  implement  a 
first-best  allocation  using  an  incentive  contract  constructed  on  the  basis  of 
a  first-best  payment  scheme.  Such  a  contract  relies  on  the  possibility  of 
discriminate  actions  according  to the  outcome  by  imposing  a  penalty  whenever 
the  observed  outcome  is  lower  than  the  admissible  ones.  The  elimination  of 
inefficient  behavior  depends  basically  on  the  outcome  function,  and  we  find 
that  the  fine  is  finite  in  the  more  interesting  cases.  The  implementation  of 
the  first-best  solution  does  not  depend  on  the  principal's  risk  neutrality. 
Nevertheless,  when  the  principal  is  risk  neutral,  the  ef f icient  contract  is 
dichotomous. Moreover,  we  prove  that  the  efficient  allocation  can  be  reached 
through  such  a  dichotomous  payment  scheme  if  and  only  if  the  principal  is 
risk neutral for a  certain range of  returns. 